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## De Vita Contemplativa, 483, 46 f.

Vebnon Bartlet

The Classical Review / Volume 12 / Issue 02 / March 1898, pp 104 - 106

DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X00025567, Published online: 27 October 2009

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### How to cite this article:

Vebnon Bartlet (1898). De Vita Contemplativa, 483, 46 f.. The Classical Review, 12, pp 104-106 doi:10.1017/S0009840X00025567

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tenses. So far is this change of tense from being opposed to my theory, that it is exactly what that theory would demand and is in strong confirmation of it. Compare, for instance, my words on p. 14 (146): 'If my distinction between the two tenses is correct, we should expect that a prohibition dealing with mere mental action e.g. "Do not suppose," "Do not be surprised," "*Do not be afraid*" would commonly take the present tense, because such prohibitions would not commonly be accompanied by strong emotion, and, *as far as the interests of the speaker are concerned, it matters little whether the prohibition be complied with or not. Such a condition of things is exactly what we find,* etc., etc. It will be clear from this quotation that *caue pertimescas* is in exact accord with my theory. The act referred to in *ne dimiseris* is something that concerns the happiness and welfare of Cicero and his friends. Cicero, as is shown by the letters written by him at this period, is in terrible anxiety and suspense—he does not know whether his cause is, or is not, past all hope. The failure to comply with the prohibition *ne dimiseris* might mean utter despair, and, naturally enough, he throws his whole heart into the prohibition. But there is nothing about the idea of *pertimescas caue* to call for emotional expression; the mention of the *leones* is a playful allusion to a mere myth that Antonius was wont to ride in a carriage drawn by lions, and how lightly these words are uttered is shown by the sentence that immediately follows them, viz. *nihil est illo homine iucundius*. As regards the meaning of the present tense here and elsewhere, I am in complete accord with Delbrück as will appear more clearly in my *Studies*, above mentioned.

Finally, I come to a state of things which Delbrück's theory, as it seems to me, utterly fails to account for. He claims that, as far as the character itself of the perfect tense is concerned, it is merely 'punktuell,' and that, if the speaker who uses it is frequently aroused with emotion and is speaking with unceremoniousness or with unusual earnest-

ness, this is merely incidental and this tone is not conveyed or suggested by the tense itself. How then will Delbrück account for the fact, brought out in my Latin Prohibitive that there is (at least prior to Livy) not a single instance in Latin literature (whether in prose or poetry) of *ne* with the perfect subjunctive used in a dignified, ceremonious, deferential style. Why does not Cicero, for instance, occasionally use it in addressing the judges? He addresses prohibitions to them with great frequency. Why does he always adopt some other form of prohibition? It cannot be because he has any particular prejudice against *ne* with the perfect subjunctive, for he uses this form of prohibition very frequently in his colloquial styles. In his letters there are fourteen instances of this use and these, almost without exception, are addressed to bosom friends with whom he was wont to throw off all ceremony, often indulging in good-natured raillery and abuse and unrestrained passionate outbursts. If, as I contend, the perfect tense came to be associated and identified with an unceremonious, energetic tone, the absence of this mode of expression from ceremonious styles is fully accounted for. But if the force of the aorist is purely and simply 'punktuell,' then I fail to see why Cicero, for instance, did not occasionally use it in addressing a judge as well as in writing to his legal friend Trebatius, whom he was so fond of hauling over the coals.

It will also be noticed that Delbrück himself admits (e.g. pp. 377, 380) that there are passages which his own theory fails to explain.

While I have felt inclined to question the justness of these few details of his treatment of the Latin perfect subjunctive, I cannot, in closing, refrain from expressing my profound admiration of, and my gratitude for, the monumental services which Delbrück has, by his latest volume, as by his preceding volumes, rendered to all students of language.

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#### DE VITA CONTEMPLATIVA, 483, 46 f.

\*Οὐ ἐνῆργετο διαφερόντως ἡ οἰκεία θεωρεῖν.

A STUDY of the form in which this passage occurs in Eusebius, *H.E.* ii. 17, has led me in view of the variants in the MSS. to a

result differing from that reached by Mr. Conybeare, the most recent editor of the treatise. Philo is describing the allegorical exegesis of the Therapeutae, which, says he, rests upon the idea that the Jewish Law is

like a living being, its body answering to the literal precepts, its soul to the unseen thought enshrined in the words—*ψυχὴν δὲ τὸν ἐναποκείμενον ταῖς λέξεσιν ἀόρατον νοῦν*. Then Mr. Conybeare's text continues, *ἐν ᾧ ἤρξατο ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ διαφερόντως τὰ οἰκεία θεωρεῖν ὡς περ διὰ κατόπτρου τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξάισια κάλλη νοημάτων ἐμφερόμενα κατιδοῦσα*, κ.τ.λ. Taking this as it stands, as representing some stage of the text, he looks about for the subject to *ἤρξατο...κατιδοῦσα*, and can only find it by going back four lines, changing the text on the sole authority of the Armenian version from *αἱ δὲ ἐξηγήσεις...γίνονται* to *ἡ δὲ ἐξήγησις...γίνεται*, and throwing the three lines which follow, as far as *νοῦν*, into a parenthesis. Even so, as he feels in his note, *ἐξήγησις* is no fit subject to *ἤρξατο θεωρεῖν*. And his real mind is given in the remark (to which he has not adjusted the text, however) that 'no change is necessary; for it must be the logical soul, and not the explanation, which beholds through the names its kindred truths.' The fact is that there is a corruption of text in *ἐν ᾧ...θεωρεῖν*. 'The lacuna of the (Armenian) version must have also been in Eusebius' text of Philo, and the confusion of that text is the result of efforts made by scribes to replace the words omitted. Eusebius' text and the Greek text of the Armenian must have flowed from a common archetype.'

Now what is the MSS. evidence for the whole matter, whether in Philo or in Eusebius? It may be set forth as follows:—

*ἐν ᾧ ἤρξατο ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ διαφερόντως τὰ οἰκεία θεωρεῖν* AβγP

*ὃν ἐνῆρξατο ἡ ψυχὴ διαφ. ἡ οἰκεία θεωρεῖν* OQ  
*ὃν ἤρξατο διαφ. ἡ θρησκεία αὐτῇ θεωρεῖν*  
 Euseb. (B)C(D)F<sup>ab</sup>R<sup>a</sup>

*ὃν.....ἡ οἰκία αὐτῇ* Euseb. GHOS<sup>1</sup> Arm.

*ὃν.....ἡ οἰκεία* Euseb. AE.

Rufinus' version of Eusebius is rather obscure, reading *quem illi ab auctoribus suis edocti sublimius et nobilius (velut inspicientes per speculum) contemplantur*—a paraphrase which we hope to clear up in the sequel. The Armenian was less courageous and left the difficulty severely alone.

Here AβγP really represent only four MSS. on Mr. Conybeare's own principles: for β and γ, though symbols for groups of MSS., go back to two archetypes parallel to those of AOPQ. Hence there is no decisive

Greek MS. evidence for preferring *ἐν ᾧ* ('the force' of which Mr. C. admits 'is not clear') to *ὃν*, read by MSS. which each preserve some very good readings, and in combination are of high worth. We take, then, the reading of OQ to be the best direct Philonian reading, which has also the support so far of the Eusebian MSS. But which of the Eusebian readings is best? And can one of them even preserve Philo's actual words?

My own view is that the reading of AE meets all the requirements of the Philonian autograph, and also of the Eusebian variants. It has the great merit of being at once good sense and yet not being too easily seen to be such. The soul (*ψυχὴ*) of the Mosaic Legislation consisted in the mind (*νοῦς*) latent in its words, *ὃν ἤρξατο διαφερόντως ἡ οἰκεία* (sc. *ψυχὴ*) *θεωρεῖν*, 'which the kindred soul *par excellence* begins to contemplate.' This terse clause might soon become a hard saying to copyists; with the results shown in the *apparatus criticus* above. First we get *ἡ ψυχὴ* added in the thoughtful archetype of OQ: and along the line of transmission known to Eusebius we have sheer paraphrase represented by *ἡ θρησκεία αὐτῇ* (in the most faithful or conservative group of Eusebian MSS., and probably also in Rufinus' *illi ab auctoribus suis edocti*). Next the connection of *ἡ οἰκεία* with the added *ἡ ψυχὴ* is missed, through the intervening *διαφερόντως* (now less needful); *ἡ οἰκεία* becomes *τὰ οἰκεία*, which in turn necessitates the substitution of *ἐν ᾧ* for *ὃν*; and the whole is rounded off by the addition of *λογικὴ* to define the special sense in which *ψυχὴ*, now bereft of *ἡ οἰκεία*, is to be understood. This gives us the reading of AβγP. On the other hand, the tendency to assimilate the Eusebian extracts to the text of Philo himself is operating on the Eusebian MSS.: and we get the mixed *ἡ οἰκία* (= *οἰκεία*) *αὐτῇ* substituted for *ἡ θρησκεία αὐτῇ* in GHOS Arm. Finally in the direct Philonian tradition, the Armenian version (though possibly at a date even prior to the ancestor of AβγP) gave up the clause as hopeless, and so perfected its destruction. While on the contrary the development in the Eusebian line of transmission perfected itself in returning back, by complete assimilation, to the pure text of Philo, in the highly assimilative MSS. AE.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> I hold it probable that the assimilative zeal of the archetype of these codices did not quite extend to the restoration of *ἐνῆρξατο* (as in OQ of Philo) for the tamer *ἤρξατο*. Hence the autograph of Philo most likely had *ὃν ἐνῆρξατο διαφερόντως ἡ οἰκεία θεωρεῖν*.

<sup>1</sup> A Sinaitic MS. of the eleventh century, the reading of which I owe to the kindness of Mrs. Lewis and Mrs. Gibson of Cambridge.

If this be the true story of the fortunes of this poor reading, it is a very pretty one, and deserves to be told not only for the sake of a Philo pure and undefiled, but also for its own sake and possibly also for the

light it would shed on the MSS. of Eusebius.

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## HOMERICA.

E. 723. *χάλκεα ὀκτάκνημα σιδηρέη ἄξονι ἀμφίς.*

Here we have a line with two metrical defects, the hiatus after the first and after the fifth foot—both dactyls. The first is defended as legitimate, though Bentley's *χάλκει'* would be an easy remedy. For the second, two defences are conceivable, neither of them very strong or convincing (1) that hiatus licitus might graciously extend the shelter of his shield even here, as a few examples may certainly be found of an open vowel in this position, (2) that the *ι* of the dative may in very remote times have been long, like the bows which our forefathers drew, though modern philologists sometimes take shots quite as long as they did.

Then there is *ὀκτάκνημα*, about which a battle has raged. Cobet and Nauck would write *ὀκτώκνημα* with considerable force of analogy on their side *v.* Cobet, *Misc. Crit.* p. 413. It is impossible to avoid remarking on this adjective that *κνήμαι* does not seem to occur with the meaning of 'spokes' in any author. Probably, however, the coiner of *ὀκτάκνημα* or *ὀκτώκνημα* felt that as *κνήμη* denoted the 'leg below the knee' in speaking of a human being, it might safely be relied upon to denote the spoke and only the spoke in connection with a wheel, there being no other part of a wheel that bears even the remotest likeness to a man's leg.

The passage in which this line occurs runs thus :—

*"Ἡβη δ' ἀμφ' ὀχέεσσι θοῶς βάλε καμπύλα κύκλα,  
χάλκεα ὀκτάκνημα, σιδηρέη ἄξονι ἀμφίς.  
τῶν ἧ τοι χρυσή ἵπυς ἄφθιτος, αὐτὰρ ὑπερβεν  
χάλκε' ἐπίσσωτρα προσαρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.  
πλήμναι δ' ἀργύρου εἰσὶ περιδρομοὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν.*

In these lines the wheels, it is to be observed, are described in considerable detail. The felloes are made of gold. The tires are of copper. The naves are of silver. Now is it conceivable that any poet, let alone Homer, or any prose author for that matter, could begin by describing wheels with such component parts—only the spokes

have been omitted—as 'bronze,' 'copper' *χάλκεα*? Assuredly not. Clearly, the inferior but stronger metal, *χαλκός*, is only placed on the external surface of the wheel that would touch the ground, to sustain the wear and tear and protect the more precious and softer metal, *χρυσός*. I do not believe for a moment that Homer meant that the spokes should be of copper; but let them be thrown in with the tire, still the whole wheel could not rationally or naturally be called a copper or a bronze one.

The fact is, the whole line (723) is a transparent interpolation. The concocter of it was not satisfied with Homer's

*ἀμφ' ὀχέεσσι θοῶς βάλε καμπύλα κύκλα*

'She quickly put the round wheels on the chariot.' He wished to define more specifically and accurately where the wheels were attached, and so he devised the luminous, if unmetrical,

*σιδηρέη ἄξονι ἀμφίς.*

He doubtless thought this might pass muster even after *ἀμφ' ὀχέεσσι*, especially if he made the delicate variation of *ἀμφίς* for *ἀμφί*, though it is obvious enough that the passage requires the preposition in both places. Then he had to fill up the line, the precise point at which an interpolation usually comes to grief. He evolved *ὀκτάκνημα* or *ὀκτώκνημα* not flawless, as we have seen, though the idea of doubling or increasing the number of spokes used for chariots on earth is not without merit. So far his work was tolerably successful, but the final touch *χάλκεα* or *χάλκει'*, which, no doubt, he fondly hoped would be taken to refer to the spokes alone, has proved fatal to the imposture. Alas! it too incontestably betrays the quality of the beast (*pace tanti viri*) masquerading in the lion's skin. This one absurdity enables us to see at once why and wherefore the line is so fruitful in metrical and linguistic anomalies.

T. L. AGAR.